MACS

A bitcoin custody-system language for describing, comparing, and reasoning before claims harden.

  • Early design
  • Not a standard
  • Not an implementation plan

MACS begins before custody categories become product claims.

Custody systems are often compared by surface labels before their actors, assumptions, trust boundaries, and failure modes are described precisely.

Labels arrive too early

MACS starts from the problem that terms like wallet, multisig, assisted custody, or vault can hide the mechanism that actually carries risk.

Description is prior work

MACS aims to describe who can act, what is controlled, and under which conditions before comparison begins.

Claims need anchors

MACS connects design claims to assumptions, boundaries, and recoverable failure paths so readers can inspect the reasoning.

Reasoning is inspectable

MACS points toward custody language that supports review before product language gets too confident.

MACS is not a public framework today.

MACS is an early design direction, not a finished taxonomy, public standard, source release, certification scheme, or implementation plan.

Not a standard

MACS does not define a public conformance target or certification label.

Not source-visible yet

There is no public MACS framework or repository to inspect at this stage.

Not product proof

A vocabulary can improve review, but it does not prove a custody product is safe or complete.

Not a shortcut

Teams still need threat modeling, usability work, operational drills, testing, and review.